

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 7, 2000

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

**FROM:** T. Dwyer, H. Waugh, and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending July 7, 2000

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** T. Dwyer, H. Waugh, and W. White were on site all week. Note that Monday and Tuesday were contractor holidays at Pantex.

**Canned Secondary Assembly (CSA) Issues:** LANL provided AAO and M&H with some initial rate curves for 2 of the weapons programs of interest this week, providing “times to reach critical temperature” given incident heat flux as the independent variable. An assumed failure point was used [formal failure effects analyses to follow] in calculating that these curves incorporated a factor of safety ranging from 2 to 5. Discussions on the background assumptions and a technical interchange on the analyses between LANL and the Board’s staff are scheduled to occur next week. In the mean time, AAO has taken the initiative by sending a letter to the Board addressing interim compensatory actions. A more detailed briefing is also being developed, although it is not clear that the briefing will be delivered before W76 Milestone 3.<sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Lightning Issues:** The contractor readiness assessment for the lightning protection BIO module continued this week. It is not clear that the readiness assessment can be completed before the July 14<sup>th</sup> goal. During the readiness assessment, AAO initiated an unrelated, no-notice lightning drill. The drill was intended to demonstrate the ability to respond to lightning warnings without using the public address system. Facility managers received the warnings and responded to the Emergency Operations Center within the 20 minute time limit. It is not known whether individual weapons operations were successfully halted in accordance with the BIO.

The NESSG for the Lightning Protection BIO NES Master Study conducted a 2<sup>nd</sup> adequacy review of the input document via telephone conference. The NESSG agreed that the document was adequate, and the Master Study will proceed on July 31<sup>st</sup>. The scope of the study will be limited to the electrical hazards to nuclear explosives resulting from lightning and will exclude other potential effects [e.g., fires, spalling, etc.] that could be caused by lightning strikes.<sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Recommendation 99-1:** Anticipating receipt of additional spending authorization [supplemental appropriations], DP, DOE-AL, and AAO held discussions today to parse out the expected \$7.5 million in funds among the \$12 million worth of programs/projects for which the additional budget had been requested. Initial reports indicate that one program not fully funded was the AL-R8 Sealed Insert (SI) Repackaging Line. Based on projected monies, the target repackaging throughput rate would have had to be formally reduced from 200 pits per month [as committed by the Secretary of Energy in the Recommendation 99-1 Implementation Plan] to 100 pits per month. Immediately following the discussions, AAO received the Board letter [dated July 7<sup>th</sup>] addressing this issue. The Site Representatives expect that disposition of the funds will undergo at least 1 more round of negotiations.<sup>[II.A]</sup>